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NEW MEDIA, FREE EXPRESSION, AND THE 
OFFENCES AGAINST THE STATE ACTS 





Social media has swept the globe. As of October 2019, Facebook reported 2.414 billion active 
users worldwide.1 YouTube, WhatsApp, and Instagram were not far behind, with 2 billion, 
1.6 billion, and 1 billion users respectively.2 Ireland has ridden the wave: 3.2 million people 
(66% of the population) use social media for an average of nearly two hours per day.3 By 2022, 
the number of domestic Facebook users is expected to reach 2.92 million.4 Forty-one percent 
of the population uses Instagram (65% daily); 30% uses Twitter (40% daily), and another 30% 
uses LinkedIn.5  
Social media is no longer a college dorm room project to ascertain who is hot (or not). It 
has taken off, and it has done so in ways that have transformed the nature of what is being 
done online. Networking companies like Facebook have been joined by apps that provide 
product and service reviews, such as Yelp, TripAdvisor, and Amazon Spark. Microbloggers 
extend beyond Twitter to companies like Plurk, 4Chan, and its notorious legacy 8Chan. 
Photosharing marks not just Instagram, but popular alternatives like Imgur, Snapchat, and 
Pinterest. Music and videos can be shared through not just YouTube but Periscope, Vimeo, 
TikTok, Facecast and other sites. Other sectors within social media aggregate news and 
facilitate discussion, such as Reddit and Quora. Still others focus on the peer-to-peer sharing 
economy, like Rover or AirBnB. 
Over the past decade these and other sites have transformed the nature of what happens in 
the online world. Beyond mere communication, social media creates a common, lived 
experience. It filters information through emotion. It democratises influence. And it creates an 
entirely new power structure that can be manipulated in ways that have profound 
consequences. 
The deleterious impact of new media on the social fabric matters. Scholars have begun to 
write at length about the increases in stress and alienation that result; risiing levels of 
depression and suicide that stem from online dependence and replacing analogical experience 
with electronic interaction; and escalating levels of anxiety that find root in the validation 
expectation of the ‘like’ function.6 Re-posting indicates emotion, and study after study has 
 
* I am indebted to Professor Fergal Davis and Professor Mark Coen for their invitation to be part of this volume, 
and to all of the symposium participants for a lively exchange at the Sutherland School of Law, Dublin. I also am 
grateful to Georgetown Law Research Librarian Jeremy McCabe, J.D., for his assistance in obtaining many of the 
materials used in this chapter.  
1 Simon Kemp, ‘Digital 2019: Q4 Global Digital Statshot’ (DataReportal, 23 October 2019) slide 24 
https://datareportal.com/reports/digital-2019-q4-global-digital-statshot. See also ‘Most Popular Social Networks 
Worldwide as of January 2020, Ranked by Number of Active Users’ (Statista, 25 January 2020) 
www.statista.com/statistics/272014/global-social-networks-ranked-by-number-of-users/. 
2 ibid. 
3 Simon Kemp, ‘Digital 2019: Ireland’ (DataReportal 31 January 2019) slides 19 and 31 
https://datareportal.com/reports/digital-2019-ireland. 
4 S. O’Dea, ‘Forecast of the Facebook User Penetration Rate in Ireland from 2015-2022’ (Statista, July 2017), 
www.statista.com/statistics/566781/predicted-facebook-user-penetration-rate-ireland/. See also Karen Twomey, 
‘Social Media Stats Ireland 2019’ (Communications Hub 12 August 2019) 
http://communicationshub.ie/blog/2019/08/12/social-media-statistics-ireland-2019/. 
5 ibid. 
6 See, eg, Cal Newport, Digital Minimalism: Choosing a Focused Life in a Noisy World (New York, 
Portfolio/Penguin 2019); Jean M Twenge et al, ‘Increases in Depressive Symptoms, Suicide-Related Outcomes, 
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found that of all emotions, fear and anger transfer most readily online.7 Confronted by 
situations that go against individuals’ principles, passion’s only outlet may be a vehement 
tirade—which itself then gets picked up and re-posted, along with more emotional content, 
driving society ever to extremes. 
There are also significant political risks that accompany this new genre, which are 
magnified by the ways in which social networks can be manipulated. Hostile actors can use 
the platforms to deepen political schisms, to promote certain candidates, and, as demonstrated 
by the recent Cambridge Analytica debacle, to swing elections.8 Simultaneously, terrorist 
organisations can use online platforms to recruit fighters—a method via which ISIS has 
managed to convince 30,000 foreign fighters to join their cause.9 The Islamic State opened 
franchises from Libya to Bangladesh, even as lone wolves, inspired by online postings, sprung 
up from Paris to San Bernadino. 
In Ireland, since 1939, the Offences Against the State Act (OAS) has served as the primary 
vehicle for confronting political violence. How effective is it in light of new media and the 
novel types of threats that it poses? Terrorist recruitment is just the tip of the iceberg. Social 
networking sites allow for targeted and global fundraising, international direction and control, 
anonymous power structures, and access to critical expertise. The platform can create the 
oceans within which extreme ideologies can prosper—and it can do so, targeting individuals 
likely to be sympathetic to the cause, 24 hours a day, seven days a week, ad infinitum. It is an 
alternative reality, subject to factual manipulation and direction—a problem exacerbated by 
the risk of so-called deep fakes: autonomously-generated content that makes it appear that 
people acted, or that certain circumstances occurred, which never did.10  
In November 2019 the Irish Government approved new regulations for social media 
platforms.11 To ensure election integrity, the new measure targets political advertising and 
tries to ensure that voters have access to accurate information.12 These provisions do not 
address the myriad further political risks posed by new media. This chapter, accordingly, 
focuses on ways in which the Offences Against the State Act (OAS) and related laws have 
historically treated free expression as a prelude to understanding how and whether the existing 
provisions are adequate for the types of challenges brought by new media. 
 
II. THE FIRES OF IRISH REPUBLICANISM 
 
 
and Suicide Rates Among U.S. Adolescents After 2010 and Links to Increased New Media Screen Time’ (2018) 
6 Clinical Psychological Science 3; Heather Clelland Woods and Holly Scott, ‘#Sleepyteens: Social Media Use 
in Adolescence Is Associated with Poor Sleep Quality, Anxiety, Depression and Low Self-Esteem’ (2016) 51 
Journal of Adolescence 41; Hugues Sampasa-Kanyinga and Rosamund F. Lewis, ‘Frequent Use of Social 
Networking Sites Is Associated with Poor Psychological Functioning among Children and Adolescents’ (2015) 
18 Cyberpsychology, Behavior, and Social Networking; Jesse Fox and Jennifer J. Moreland, ‘The Dark Side of 
Social Networking Sites: An Exploration of the Relational and Psychological Stressors Associated with Facebook 
Use and Affordances’ (2015) 45 Computers in Human Behavior 168; Jon D Elhai et al, ‘Fear of Missing Out, 
Need for Touch, Anxiety and Depression Are Related to Problematic Smartphone Use’ (2016) 63 Computers in 
Human Behavior 509. 
7 PW Singer and Emerson T Brooking, Like War: The Weaponization of Social Media (Boston, Houghton Mifflin 
Harcourt 2018). 
8 Carole Cadwalladr, ‘Fresh Cambridge Analytica Leak ‘Shows Global Manipulation Is Out of Control’’ The 
Guardian (London, 4 January 2020) www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2020/jan/04/cambridge-analytica-data-leak-
global-election-manipulation. 
9 Singer & Brooking, Like War (2018) (n 7). 
10 Bobby Chesney and Danielle Keats Citron, ‘Deep Fakes: A Looming Challenge for Privacy, Democracy, and 
National Security’ (2019) 107 California Law Review 1753. 





Like the Irish Free State Constitution, the Treasonable Offences Act, and Public Safety Acts, 
was forged in the fires of Irish Republicanism. These laws contained numerous provisions that 
restricted speech, press, broadcast, and publication. The 1937 Constitution cemented many of 
their elements into the structure of the state, creating an environment within which the 1939 
OAS could later expand. This section outlines the evolution of measures in these instruments 
that most directly impacted free expression. 
 
A. Legal Framing Prior to the Offences Against the State Act 
 
The 1922 Free State Constitution explicitly protected free expression, outside of a narrow 
exception for public morality.13 Nevertheless, the Government almost immediately mounted 
an aggressive anti-Republican counterterrorist campaign targeting oral and written words that 
encouraged or facilitated criminal acts, violence, or the overthrow of the state, or that masqued 
evidence necessary for prosecution. In 1937, these measures became folded into the new 
Constitution, bringing with them a general orientation against anti-Treaty Republicanism. 
 
1. The 1925 Treasonable Offences Act 
 
In May 1923, the Irish Civil War ended with Éamon de Valera and Frank Aiken’s call for 
the end of the armed struggle.14 But violent skirmishes, punctuated by hunger strikes rejecting 
the imprisonment of anti-Treatyites, continued.15 High unemployment and food shortages 
further exacerbated civil, social, and political tension. Cuman na nGaedheal, which came into 
power in the August 1923 election, took steps to protect the fledgling state, amongst which 
were restrictions on speech. 
Under the Treasonable Offences Act of 1925, it became an offence to conspire with or to 
incite others to attempt to overthrow the government of Saorstát Eireann.16 Associated 
treasonable documents could be recovered based on an oath made to a District Court by the 
 
13 Constitution of the Irish Free State 1922, Art. 9 (‘The right of free expression of opinion as well as the right to 
assemble peaceably and without arms, and to form associations or unions is guaranteed for purposes not opposed 
to public morality.’) See also Censorship of Publications Act 1929, ss 6, 17 and 2 (empowering the Minister for 
Justice to refer books and periodicals considered indecent or obscene, or advocating ‘the unnatural prevention of 
conception or the procurement of abortion or miscarriage’ to a Censorship of Publications Board for review and 
potential prohibition; amending the Indecent Advertisements Act 1889, to include advertisements related to 
sexually transmitted diseases and medical conditions related to the sexual organs; and prohibiting import, 
possession, or sale of indecent pictures (defined as ‘suggestive of, or inciting to sexual immorality or unnatural 
vice or likely in any other similar way to corrupt or deprave’); Censorship of Publications Act 1946 (establishing 
a Censorship of Publications Board and Appeal Board; empowering customs officers to detain books at the 
border and forward them to the board; creating a more general review power of periodicals determined to have 
consistently had indecent or obscene materials or advocating contraception of abortion or devoting ‘an unduly 
large proportion of space to the publication of matter relating to crime’.); Censorship of Films Act 1923 
(prohibiting the showing of films deemed to be indecent, obscene, or blasphemous, or contrary to public 
morality). For further discussion of censorship in Ireland for reasons of public morality see Kevin Rockett, Irish 
Film Censorship: A Cultural Journey from Silent Cinema to Internet Pornography (Dublin, Four Courts Press 
2004). 
14 On 24 May, Aiken directed the anti-Treaty troops to give up their arms; that same day, de Valera issued a 
message to the ‘Soldiers of the Republic, Legion of the Rearguard’, in which he called for an end to the fighting. 
Discussed and reprinted in Sean McMahon, Rebel Ireland: Easter Rising to Civil War (Cork, Mercier Press 
2001) (‘Soldiers of the Republic. Legion of the Rearguard: The Republic can no longer be defended successfully 
by your arms. Further sacrifice of life would now be in vain and the continuance of the struggle in arms unwise in 
the national interest and prejudicial to the future of our cause. Military victory must be allowed to rest for the 
moment with those who have destroyed the Republic. Other means must be sought to safeguard the nation’s 
right’.) 
15 But see R (O’Brien) v Military Governor, North Dublin Union [1924] 1 IR 32 (according the release of 
prisoners on 31 July 1923 owing to an absence of a state of war as the legal end of the Civil War). 
16 Treasonable Offences Act 1925, s 1(c), (e). 
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Gárda Síochána stating that there were reasonable grounds to suspect the location of such 
material.17 The statute forbade the administration or taking of any oath pledging to commit, 
promote, or conceal the commission of any crime.18 It also was illegal to refuse to speak when 
requested for information about any crime or breach of the peace.19  
While the anti-treason legislation was used to prosecute members of the Irish Republican 
Army (IRA), it proved problematic in light of the level of sympathy accorded to Anti-
Treatyites—former comrades at arms, joined in common cause. During the 1916 Easter 
Rising, moreover, the treason laws had been used by the Crown against insurgents.20 The 
measures adopted in 1925, moreover, derived from British measures repeatedly used by the 
Crown against the Irish.21 Parts of these laws were designed rather more for conviction than 
for ensuring, as a precursor to conviction, evidence of personal guilt. Under the 1848 Treason 
Felony Act, for instance, it was not necessary to demonstrate that an individual had themselves 
engaged in treasonous activity; instead, it was sufficient to demonstrate that an individual was 
a member of an organisation having treason as its object, and that some overt act had been 
done by the organisation in furtherance of the end.22 The reasoning for adopting this approach 
was rooted in concerns about juror intimidation, but the result was a statutory framework that 
appeared to be rigged for conviction.  
The re-enactment of parts of the Treason Felony Act 1848 into the 1925 statute did little 
to demonstrate a break with the past.23 Consequently, the measures did not assume center 
stage, and the emphasis for dealing with the violence shifted to the public safety acts and, 
thence, to the 1939 Offences Against the State Act. 
 
2. The 1923-31 Public Safety Acts and Article 2A 
 
The 1923 Public Safety Act was born of Civil War. It provided broad powers of detention 
and internment.24 Punishments ranged from the seizure of property to flogging, imprisonment, 
and death.25 When the legislation expired, two provisions took its place, both of which 
implicated speech. But by far the most expansive public safety restrictions on free expression 
came in 1931 with the insertion of Article 2A into the constitution. 
 
17 ibid s 10(1). See also ibid s 10(4), defining ‘treasonable document’ as ‘any document which relates, directly or 
indirectly, to the commission of any Act’ within the statute deemed to be treason, a felony, or a misdemeanor). 
18 ibid s 9(1)(a). 
19 ibid s 9(1)(c)-(d). 
20 Michael Head, Crimes against the State: from Treason to Terrorism (Farnham, Ashgate 2011) 99. 
21 See Treason Act 1795 (36 Geo 3 c 7) (Eng); Treason Act 1817 (57 Geo 3 c 6) (Eng); Treason Felony Act 1848 
(11 & 12 Vict c 12) (Eng); 
22 R v Meaney [1867] 15 WR 1082, [1867] IR 1 CL 500, [1867] 10 Cox CC 506. 
23 Compare Treasonable Offences Act 1925, s 3(1) (making it illegal to attempt ‘by force of arms or other violent 
means to overawe or intimidate in any way either the Governor-General or the Executive Council or any member 
thereof or any other minister duly appointed under and in accordance with the Constitution, or the Oireachtas or 
either House thereof, or any lawful court or any judge of any such court with a view to influencing their or his 
actions’) and Treason Felony Act 1848 (11 & 12 Vict. c 12) s 3 (Eng) (saying if any person attempted to ‘levy 
War against Her Majesty, Her Heirs or Successors, within any Part of the United Kingdom, in order by Force or 
Constraint to compel Her or Them to change Her or Their Measures or Counsels, or in order to put any Force or 
Constraint upon or in order to intimidate or overawe both Houses or either House of Parliament ... [or] shall 
express, utter, or declare, by publishing any Printing or Writing, or by open and advised Speaking, or by any 
overt Act or Deed, every Person so offending shall be guilty of Felony’). 
24 Public Safety (Emergency Powers) Act 1923. 
25 ibid. See also Public Safety (Emergency Powers) (No 2) Act 1923; Barry Vaughan and Shane Kilcommins, 
Terrorism, Rights and the Rule of Law: Negotiating Justice in Ireland (Cullompton, Willan Publishing 2008) 70 
(writing, ‘While the inchoate government had successfully stifled opposing forces, its victory raised some 
awkward and unanswered questions. How sustained was Ireland’s commitment to liberal democratic values given 
that when faced with a crisis, it resorted to emergency powers that cut across any notion of the rule of law?’) 
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The 1924 Public Safety Act contained within its auspices powers of entry, search, seizure, 
as well as arrest, for individuals suspected of inciting others to overthrow the Government or 
to neglect their official duties.26 In April 1924, a second act made it illegal to induce or to 
attempt to induce a member of Saorstát Eireann to refuse to discharge his duty.27 These 
provisions meant that challenging individuals for taking part in lawful government activity 
could result in imprisonment.  
In 1926, an additional public safety act made allowance for the proclamation of a public 
emergency during which the Executive Minister could assume extraordinary powers related 
to arrest and detention.28 These powers were premised in part on the foregoing crimes of 
incitement and inducement, as well as those detailed in the 1925 Treasonable Offences Act.29 
The Civil War ended in the early 1920s. Within a decade, violence propagated by the IRA, 
Fianna Eireann, Cumann na mBan, Saor Eire, and the communist revolutionary groups 
proliferated. Cumann na nGaedheal, under W.T. Cosgrave’s leadership, responded by swiftly 
ushering a new public safety statute through the Oireachtas, which would result in a new 
provision, Article 2A, being added to the Irish Free State Constitution.30 In the Dáil, Cosgrave 
promoted it as a way to safeguard the rights of the people.  
 
Under the Constitution there is full and untrammeled liberty for any person to advocate 
and recommend to his fellow-citizens, openly by speech and writing, the adoption of 
any political programme whatsoever, even the adoption of different forms of 
Government and to put his programme into operation as soon as he has induced a 
majority of the citizens to support it in the polling booths.31 
 
For Cosgrave, it was precisely because of the protection of rights that violent agitation was 
unnecessary and, therefore, a legitimate target of new state measures.32  
The Minister for Defence, Desmond FitzGerald, made a more philosophical point, asking 
‘Why have we a Constitution at all? Why have we a Government? Why have we a State?’33 
To his mind, ‘we have a Government and a State because we were made to live in society that 
man, being subject to the performance of evil, requires to be controlled by law.’34 The fact that 
the measures were coercive did not make them any different from the Egg Grading Act or the 
Live Stock Bill. They were simply being directed at a serious threat: 
 
There is a tendency to evil in everybody, and in every community there is a certain 
number of people in whom the criminal instinct overcomes the instinct for good. This 
 
26 Public Safety (Powers of Arrest and Detention) Temporary Act of 1924, sch ss (1)-(2). 
27 Public Safety (Punishment of Offences) Temporary Act 1924. 
28 Public Safety (Emergency Powers) Act 1926, sch ss (1), (2), and (14). Legislation passed by the Parliament of 
Northern Ireland paralleled this statute. See Emergency Powers Act (NI) 1926 (16 & 17 Geo 5 c 8) (empowering 
the Governor of Northern Ireland to declare a state of emergency). 
29 Public Safety (Emergency Powers) Act of 1926, schs ss (1), (2) and (14). 
30 Constitution (Amendment No 17) Act 1931. See also Ryan and Others (The State) v Lennon and Others [1935] 
IR 170 (HC), 69 ILTR 125 (determining that the Oireachtas did not act ultra vires in passing the legislation). 
Cosgrave set two days in the Dáil and a day and a half in the Senead for the bill to go through all of its stages. 
William T. Cosgrave, Dáil Deb 14 October 1931, vol 40, col 29; Tomas O’Connell (Labour Party), Dáil Deb 14 
October 1931, vol 40, col 61. Constitution of the Irish Free State 1922, Art. 50 provided and eight year grace 
period for the Oireachtas to amend the constitution without returning to the people for a referendum. The 
Oireachtas subsequently amended that article to extend the time period, with the result that from 1922 to 1937, 
the constitution could be amended by statute, which it was, on 27 occasions. For further discussion, see generally 
Gerard Hogan, The Origins of the Irish Constitution, 1928-1941 (Dublin, Royal Irish Academy 2012) 4-8. 
31 William T. Cosgrave, Dáil Deb 14 October 1931, vol 40, col 31. 
32 ibid. 
33 Desmond FitzGerald, Dáil Deb 14 October 1931, vol 40, col 69. 
34 ibid. 
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Bill has become necessary because although admittedly the people who have a 
tendency to crime in this country are a very small minority, they are organised and 
their method is the method of arms and intimidation.35 
 
To prevent violence, the Government would have to augment its power. Failure to do so would 
result in the dissolution of the state.36 
Fianna Fáil and Labour strongly objected to the speed with which the measures were 
introduced and the breadth of the powers being adopted.37 Eamon de Valera put the point 
bluntly:  
 
[T]he Executive is not proceeding on the right lines. We do not believe there is any 
immediate urgency, and that we should get time to discuss matters properly and to get 
calmly down to them and see what element of truth there is in the anxiety spread abroad. 
… [T]he Executive is going along blindly in the course it laid out for itself when it started 
on its present regime.38  
 
For Fianna Fáil, the statute’s impact could hardly be ignored: ‘The Constitution’, Seán Lemass 
argued, ‘may be the most glorious Constitution in the world, but it will be a dead letter before 
Friday evening if the Minister and his Party get their way’.39 The exceptions carved out in the 
act would abrogate constitutional rights. Lemass called out Cosgrave on the inherent 
contradiction in stating that because rights were secure, they could be suspended to prevent 
violence:  
 
Did anyone ever hear such logic before? In order to safeguard the rights of the people we 
are going to take their rights away! What are the rights of the people? The right of free 
speech, the right of free assembly, [and] freedom of the Press.40 
 
Article 2A did have a profound effect on constitutional rights. The primary goal of the 
measure was to establish an emergency court and to give it extraordinary powers to deal with 
threats to the state. To accomplish this aim, it empowered the Executive Council to declare a 
state of emergency (which resulted in the suspension of certain constitutional provisions); 
introduced new security measures; created a Special Powers Tribunal to try civilians for 
political crimes; adopted extraordinary arrest powers; and provided for proscription.41  
 
35 ibid col 70. 
36 ibid col 78 (‘I think every Deputy ... realises ... the necessity of having power and force, gun-work if necessary, 
in order to put down the propaganda of crime and the commission of crime, and to put down a whole organisation 
whose methods will destroy the moral principles of the youth of this country and will consequently destroy the 
Irish nation’). 
37 See, eg, Eamon de Valera, Dáil Deb 14 October 1931, vol 40, col 58 (‘We have no belief whatever in this 
solution when dealing with the political situation. If there are drastic measures taken, I have no doubt whatever 
they will drive it more underground.’); Tomas O’Connell (Labour Party), Dáil Deb 14 October 1931, vol 40, col 
62 (‘It is procedure of this kind that makes a farce of Parliamentary institutions and makes people have no respect 
whatsoever for them. ...  It would be far more honest, in my opinion, if the Government set up a dictatorship pure 
and simple and told us all to go about our business and that they would run the affairs of the country.’) 
38 ibid col 61. 
39 Seán Lemass, Dáil Deb 14 October 1931. vol 40, col 81. 
40 ibid cols 85-86. For a direct response to Lemass, see Minister for Justice, James Fitzzgerald-Kenney, Dáil Deb 
14 October 1931, vol 40, col 110 (‘We are told we are tearing up the Constitution. I pointed out that we are not. 
… Because the Deputies opposite are absolutely steeped in British tradition they think that a departure from the 
Constitution or the refusal of free speech at all times is a denial of liberty. In England when the liberties of the 
majority of people were threatened by a minority the people did not allow their Constitution or the principles of 
the constitution to ride roughshod over their common sense’.) 
41 Constitution (Amendment No 17) Act 1931. See also Constitution (Operation of Article 2A) Order 1931, 
SR&O 1931/72 (bringing in the provision). 
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Freedom of expression did not escape the net. The statute outlawed treasonable or 
seditious documents, defined in terms of unlawful associations.42 To be an unlawful 
association, the entity in question (and those involved), did not actually have to be known by 
a particular name. The group merely had to meet certain criteria, amongst which was 
promoting, encouraging, or advocating (a) any act of a treasonable or seditious character, (b) 
the commission of any offence, (c) the obstruction of justice; or (d) non-payment of taxes.43   
Under the act, it became illegal to possess any documents relating to associations 
furthering any of those aims.44 The burden was on the person on whose property or person 
such documents were found to demonstrate to the satisfaction of the Court (or the Special 
Tribunal) either that he did not know that the material was in his possession (or on his land or 
premises), or was unaware of the nature of the contents.45 Otherwise, mere possession was 
sufficient to demonstrate membership in an unlawful organisation.46  
The statute made further inroads into free expression. It prohibited printing, publishing, 
selling, or distributing ‘any book, newspaper, magazine, periodical, pamphlet, leaflet, circular, 
or other document’ on behalf of unlawful associations, regardless of their content.47 What this 
meant was that the material itself did not have to be seditious or treasonous. It merely had to 
be made available at the behest of an unlawful organisation. ‘Print’ was construed broadly to 
mean any mode of representing or reproducing words in visible form—including, for instance, 
merely copying other writing longhand.48 So any notes made at a meeting, any letters or 
invitations sent by members of the group, or any announcements of planned events, regardless 
of their focus, were included. The statute, in addition, gave the Special Tribunal the power to 
declare any periodical seditious and to order the Gárda Síochána to search for and to seize it.49 
Treasonable or seditious documents also became a trigger for extraordinary powers of 
stop, search, and arrest.50 The mere statement by any member of the Gárda Síochána that he 
suspected an individual to be carrying treasonable or seditious documents was treated as 
‘conclusive and final evidence, incapable of being rebutted or questioned by cross-
examination’ as a rationale for arrest.51 Simultaneously, for search of the home, the presence 
of treasonous documents became sufficient predicate under the reasonableness 
determination.52 Any documents seized under Article 2A, moreover, could be destroyed.53 
Fianna Fáil, which had bitterly opposed the statute, ended the emergency when it came to 
power in 1932 leaving the Gardaí with ordinary criminal law authorities to counter the IRA.54 
The suspension of parts II-V of Article 2A, however, did not revoke the Constitution 
(Amendment No 17) Act of 1931, leaving the underlying powers in place. Following almost 
nightly confrontations between the Blueshirts and the IRA, in 1933 Éamon de Valera re-
 
42 Constitution (Amendment No 17) Act 1931, sch (3)(1); Constitution of the Irish Free State Art. 2A(3)(1) (‘the 
expression “treasonable or seditious documents” includes any documents relating to or concerned with or issued 
or emanating from or appearing to issue or emanate from an unlawful association.’).  
43 Constitution of the Irish Free State Art 2A(3)(1), (19)(1)(a)-(f). 
44 ibid Art 2A(21). 
45 ibid. 
46 ibid Art 2A(22)(1). 
47 See ibid Art 2A(23)(1)-(2). 
48 See ibid Art 2A(23)(3). 
49 ibid Art 2A(26). 
50 ibid Art 2A(29)(1). 
51 ibid Art 2A(29)(2). 
52 ibid Art 2A(30)(1). 
53 ibid Art 2A(32). 
54 Constitution (Suspension of Article 2A) Order 1932, SR&O 1932/11 (suspending Parts II-V of Article 2A as 
authorised under Article 2A(1)(3)). 
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activated Article 2A and introduced a ban on the Blueshirts.55 Three years later, he extended 
a similar ban to the IRA.56 
Fianna Fáil’s about-face was not lost on the courts. Justice Fitgibbon observed in 1935 
that Article 2A, 
 
appears to have received the almost unanimous support of the Oireachtas for we have been 
told that those of our legislators by whom it was opposed most vehemently as 
unconstitutional and oppressive, when it was first introduced, have since completely 
changed their opinions, and now accord it their unqualified approval.57 
 
3. The 1937 Irish Constitution 
 
In 1934, Fianna Fáil began to prepare a new constitution. Foremost in the Constitution 
Committee’s mind was the concentration of power embodied in Article 2A.58 The drafters 
sought out a new way to counter political violence, embracing the potential establishment of 
special criminal courts that would be better able to withstand judge and juror intimidation. 
Following intense debate and multiple amendments, in 1937 the new constitution passed by 
national plebiscite, coming into force that December.  
Bunreacht na hÉireann repealed Section 2A, placing more restrictions on the use of 
emergency powers, even as it conditioned the right of free expression.59 It borrowed the speech 
clause from the earlier constitution and divided it into three sections. The document augmented 
prior concerns about public morality with the assurance that freedoms not be used to 
undermine the state—in essence, constitutionalising the exceptions established in the public 
safety acts.60  
The new speech clause established ‘[t]he right of the citizens to express freely their 
convictions and opinions’, while simultaneously placing controls on the radio, press, and film 
industry to ensure that communication not be used to undermine public order or morality, or 
the authority of the state.61 The document incorporated the 1925 Treasonable Offences Act as 
well, prohibiting, ‘[t]he publication or utterance of seditious’ (as well as indecent) matter.62  
 
55 Constitution (Operation of Article 2A) Order 1933, SR&O 1933/91 (bringing into force Parts II-V of Article 
2A as authorised under Article 2A(1)(2)); Constitution (Declaration of Unlawful Association) Order 1933, 
SR&O 1933/95 (banning the National Guard (another name for the Blueshirts) under Article 2A(19)(2)); 
Constitution (Declaration of Unlawful Association) (No 2) Order 1933, SR&O 1933/189 (banning the Blue Shirts 
under Article 2A(19)(2)). For a broadcast of de Valera announcing the ban on the National Guard/Blue Shirts, see 
‘Blueshirts Proclaimed Unlawful 1933’ (RTE) www.rte.ie/archives/2013/0822/469576-blueshirts-proclaimed-
unlawful-1933/ accessed 19 February 2020. 
56 Constitution (Declaration of Unlawful Association) Order 1936, SR&O 1936/172 (banning the Irish 
Republican Army / IRA / Oglaigh na hEireann under Article 2A(19)(2)). 
57 Ryan and Others (The State) v Lennon and Others [1935] IR 170 (HC) 235, quoted in Hogan, Origins (n 30) 
12. 
58 Donal K Coffey, Drafting the Irish Constitution 1935-1937: Transnational Influences in Interwar Europe 
(Cham, Palgrave Macmillan 2018) 188 (noting that the 1934 constitution committee recommended the 
replacement of Article 2A with ordinary legislation); ibid 193 (noting that the draft of 18 May 1935 provided that 
‘extraordinary courts shall not be established, save only ...’ and elaboration in the draft of 19 October 1936 
(putting the power to create extraordinary courts in the hands of the Oireachtas)). See also Gerard Hogan, ‘The 
Constitution Review Committee of 1934’ in Fionán Ó Muircheartaigh (ed), Ireland in the Coming Times: Essays 
to Celebrate T.K. Whitaker’s 80 Years (Dublin, Institute of Public Administration 1997). 
59 Constitution of Ireland (Bunreacht na hÉireann) 1937. 
60 Compare above n 13 and Constitution of Ireland 1937, Art 40.6.1°.i-iii. 
61 Constitution of Ireland 1937, Art 40.6.1°.i (‘The education of public opinion being, however, a matter of such 
grave import to the common good, the State shall endeavour to ensure that organs of public opinion, such as the 
radio, the press, the cinema, while preserving their rightful liberty of expression, including criticism of 
Government policy, shall not be used to undermine public order or morality or the authority of the State’.) 
62 ibid. 
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The 1937 constitution similarly separated out the right of assembly, allowing for peaceable 
congregation absent munitions, even as it empowered the Government to prevent or control 
meetings ‘calculated to cause a breach of the peace or to be a danger or nuisance to the general 
public.’63 Like the speech provisions, the change reflected the Article 2A approach, with 
unlawful associations premised on the marshalling of force against the government.64 It 
weighed the exception to the right against the communal interest in protecting the state. The 
constitution forbade laws regulating associations from discriminating based on political, 
religious, or class distinctions.65 Nevertheless, treasonous, anti-constitutional associations 
could not rely on Article 40 for protection.  
Since Article 2A of the prior constitution had not explicitly been continued, the new 
document superseded the earlier provisions. Article 40 thus functioned to fold in press and 
publication elements as a basis for considerations related to speech and the associative rights. 
Despite the incorporation of elements of the Treasonable Offences Act into the new 
constitution, the 1925 statute, as well as the 1926 Public Safety (Emergency Powers) Act 
remained in place. 
 
B. The Offences Against the State Act 
 
In 1939, the Oireachtas passed the OAS in an atmosphere of heightened global political 
tension.66 Totalitarianism gripped Germany as Adolph Hitler and the Third Reich in the mid-
1930s abolished the office of the President and enacted increasingly aggressive domestic 
laws.67 In 1938 the country invaded and annexed Austria and, the following year, laid claim 
to parts of Czechoslovakia—before beginning to amass soldiers on the Polish border. The 
same year, fascist leader Benito Mussolini, having established an authoritarian regime in Italy, 
invaded Albania. In Spain, a coup by right-wing military leaders in 1936 led to Civil War 
between anarchists and republicans loyal to the Second Spanish Republic, and the militaristic, 
nationalist movement. Following the assassination of Prime Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi in 1932, 
in Japan the military similarly gained control and moved the country to a more aggressive 
posture: in 1937 Japan invaded mainland China, leading to the occupation of Beijing and then 
the capital, Nanjing. From east to west, democracies were being threatened and toppled. 
Concerns about the international backdrop wove their way into debates over the Offences 
Against the State Act.68 In some ways, this made the restrictions on freedom of expression 
more palatable, as the issue was how to protect the democratic structure of the state itself—
not, more narrowly, whether to incorporate the six counties or respond to those willing to use 
violence to do so. Nevertheless, the immediate rationale offered by the Government for 
 
63 ibid Art 40.6.1°.ii. 
64 See ibid Art 40.6.1°.iii. 
65 ibid Art 40.6.2°. 
66 Offences Against the State Act 1939 (OAS 1939).  
67 See, eg, Law for the Prevention of Offspring with Hereditary Diseases (Gesetz zur Verhütung erbkranken 
Nachwuchses) s 1, 1933 RGBl I, 529 (creating a Genetic Health Court (Erbgesundheitsgericht) and mandating 
forced sterilisation for persons with certain physical and mental disabilities or chronic alcoholism); Law against 
Dangerous Habitual Criminals and on Measures for Security and Improvement (Gesetz über die gefährliche 
Gewohnheitsverbrecher und über Massregeln zur Sicherung und Besserung), 1933 RGBl I, 995 (providing for 
indefinite detention, inter alia) [RGB1 1933 I 995]; Law on Treason, 1934 RGBl I, 341 (Ger) (making most 
activities of opposition groups punishable by death); Treachery Act of 1934 (Heimtueckegesetz), 1934 RGBl I, 
1269; Law for the Protection of German Blood and Honour, 1935 RGBl I, 1146 (Ger) (creating an offence of 
‘race defilement’); Law on Alteration of Family and Personal Names, 1938 RGBl I, 9 (Ger); (requiring Jews with 
non-Jewish first name to adopt additional names (‘Israel’ for men, ‘Sara’ for women)); Ordinance Concerning the 
Passports of Jews, 1938 RGBl I, 1342 (Ger) (declaration of invalidity of all German passports held by Jews). 
68 The situation on the continent also played a role in the adoption of the First Amendment of the Constitution 
Act 1939, which amended the definition of ‘time of war’ in Article 28.3.3° to include a situation in which Europe 
was at war, while Ireland was technically at peace. See Hogan, Origins (n 30) ch 13. 
 10 
enacting new, extraordinary measures, found its traditional root: Republicanism. In an effort 
to tighten the government’s control, the new measures augmented Constitutional restrictions 
on speech, publication, and association. 
 
1. Broader Context and Supporting Arguments 
 
In 1939, the specter of WWII hung over debates in the Oireachtas. In the Seanad Professor 
Helena Concannon explained,  
 
It is because ours is a democratic State—and most of us wish it to remain such—that 
the Government we have chosen for ourselves must be provided by us with the powers 
necessary to protect the State, to defend its authority, and to carry out the duties and 
functions with which we have charged it. The most important of these is to maintain 
public order ... We have had too many examples in recent years of the dangers to 
democratic governments if they are left defenceless and if they have not those 
necessary powers.69 
 
More than just the Republican threat to government was at stake.70 The Fianna Fáil leader in 
Seanad Éireann, Seanadóir William Quirke, underscored the importance of restricting freedom 
to protect democracy itself.71 A senior member of the IRA in County Tipperary during the 
War of Independence, Quirke was well familiar with the Republican challenge. But the 
situation had changed. Looked at in this light, the proposed measures did not alter the nature 
or structure of the government. Instead, they placed restrictions on certain freedoms—
restrictions embraced by the Constitution itself. 
Members of Dáil Éireann similarly recognised the new kind of threat. James Matthew 
Dillon, a member of the Dáil for 39 years, contended that the particular threat posed by 
totalitarianism could not be ignored:  
 
I do not close my eyes to the fact that we are not living in the Victorian age and that the 
types of dangers that democracy has to face to-day are quite different from the types that 
it had to face in the 19th century.’72  
 
He continued:  
 
[I]n recent years, the technique of potential tyranny has completely changed. Certain 
… persons, observing the inherent weaknesses in any political system, such as 
democracy, that cherishes individual liberty, made up their minds that the way to 
destroy democratic government was to exploit those inherent weaknesses, and instead 
of seeking to overthrow the Constitution, they seek to use the very privileges conferred 
 
69 Professor Helena Concannon, Seanad Deb 3 May 1939, vol 22, col 1540. 
70 ibid col 1539-40, stating, ‘I hold strongly to the belief that no greater disaster could befall our people at this 
tremendously critical moment of their history—of the world’s history—than to have a defenceless and an 
unstable government at the mercy of any group with arms in their hands who might, relying simply on the “right” 
conferred by those arms, without reference to the people and trampling on democracy, usurp the functions of 
Government, flout the authority of the State the people themselves have set up, and even take it on themselves to 
declare war on other States, whether the Irish people wanted it or not’. 
71 See, eg, William Quirke, Seanad Deb 4 May 1939, vol 22, col 1557 (‘It has been suggested that this measure is 
in itself undemocratic. I say that it may appear undemocratic to some people, but it may be necessary, and is 
necessary at times, for a Government to appear undemocratic in order to preserve democracy for the people. I 
believe that the Government would be shirking their responsibility as a Government if they did not take the 
measures that they believed were necessary to protect the independence of this State’.)  
72 James Matthew Dillon, Dáil Deb 3 March 1939, vol 74, col 1440. 
 11 
by the Constitution for the purpose of destroying the Constitution itself. That is a 
danger that every democratic Government has to face at the present time, and they 
have to face it not only on one side; they have to face it from the left and from the 
right.73 
 
Dillon worried that those challenging democracy were banking on its inherent weakness and 
that the protection of individual rights would ultimately lead to the downfall of the 
government. He warned, ‘while democracy is shivering on the brink [authoritarians] can give 
democracy the felon’s blow, destroy it and grab power and after they have grabbed power then 
proceed to subjugate the people. In every case in Europe recently in which liberty has been 
overthrown you will find it has been overthrown by an infinitesimal minority’.74 
Although many members of the Oireachtas either assumed or argued that global tension 
required that the state adopt extraordinary measures, the government cited the IRA’s 
resumption of the campaign across the water, and the continued challenge mounted by 
individuals claiming to carry on the republican legacy, as justification.75 Just two months prior 
to the introduction of the OAS, the IRA had resumed a bombing campaign in Britain. Such 
was the reason provided by the Minister of Justice, Patrick Ruttledge, during the First Reading, 
for the necessity of the new measures.76 Numerous members oppugned this rationale, citing 
the absence of sufficient evidence that such a campaign was underway.77 Members raised the 
 
73 ibid cols 1440-41. 
74 ibid col 1441. 
75 See Seán Goulding, Seanad Deb 4 May 1939, vol 22, col 1551 (‘I take it that in normal times the average 
citizen need not worry his head about the Bill. But we may not be living in normal times always. The times are 
not quite normal all over Europe to-day. You have so-called ideologies—strange ideologies—worshipped by 
quite a number of people; and in this country we have probably some people who believe in one or other of those 
ideologies. In the event of those people endeavouring to upset a democratic State such as ours is and 
endeavouring to force these new ideologies on the people of this country, these extraordinary powers would be 
necessary’.); William Davin, Dáil Deb 7 March 1939, vol 74, col 1565 (‘I am of opinion that the real reasons for 
the introduction of this measure have not been given to the House. I recognise, as do many other Deputies, that 
the Taoiseach is a very cute and longheaded politician, that he probably sees the possibility of a world war—
perhaps in the near future—and the possibility of this country being dragged into that war at the tail of Great 
Britain, whether we like it or not. In such circumstances, he probably foresees the necessity for having in his 
possession repressive powers of this kind’.)  
76 Patrick Joseph Ruttledge, Dáil Deb 8 Feb 1939, vol 74, col 90 (‘As Deputies are aware, a proclamation was 
issued, on 8th December last, by a certain body which purported to hand over what it maintained it held, that is, 
certain Government functions. It described itself as a Government and it purported, under that proclamation, to 
hand over to the Irish Republican Army, as they call it, those functions of Government. That is a position which 
the Government is not going to tolerate’.) See also William Quirke, Seanad Deb 4 May 1939, vol 22, col 1554-
55. 
77 See, eg, John McLoughlin, Seanad Deb 3 May 1939, vol 22, col 1526 (‘If I had evidence that there was a 
dangerous conspiracy against the exercise of governmental authority by the people of this State, I would vote for 
this Bill, as I voted for similar Bills previously; but no such evidence has been adduced by the Minister for 
Justice of the existence in this State of any such conspiracy’.); Patrick Hogan, Seanad Deb 3 May 1939, vol 22, 
col 1534 (‘What is the great need for giving power to suppress all organisations?’); William Davin, Dáil Deb 7 
March 1939, vol 74, col 1564 (‘The Labour Party are opposing this Bill because they believe that, in the first 
instance, there is no need for it and, in the second instance, because it is depriving citizens of rights and liberties 
which the Government have no right to filch from them in the present normal conditions. No case whatsoever has 
been put forward for the passage of this measure so far as the internal state of the country is concerned’.); 
William Davin, Dáil Deb 3 March 1939, vol 74, col 1476 (‘It has not been definitely stated that these two Bills 
have any connection with the activities which have taken place recently in Great Britain’.); General Seán 
MacEoin, Dáil Deb 7 March 1939, vol 74, cols 1565-66 (‘I oppose this measure because the Minister has not, in 
my opinion, treated the House fairly. He has not seen fit to take this House into his confidence and tell us why the 
measure has been introduced at this particular time. ... This particular Bill is brought in at a time when there is 
comparative peace. At least as far as we can see, nothing is happening with which the ordinary law, if enforced, 
could not deal’.); Patrick Belton, Dáil Deb 3 March 1939, vol 74, col 1459 (‘The case has not been made for this 
Bill and I do not believe that it has been introduced at the right time. Either there is a need for it or there is not. If 
there is a need for it, tell us the need.’); Captain Patrick Giles, Dáil Deb 2 March 1939, vol 74, col 1356-57 (‘I 
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danger of normalising extraordinary powers at a time of relative peace.78 Without such 
evidence, it was hard to justify the restrictions on freedom of expression and freedom of the 
press.79 General Seán MacEoin went further, doubting that a sub-constitutional instrument 
could deprive citizens of their foundational rights.80 Fine Gael politician (and future Attorney 
General) Patrick McGilligan quoted the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, noting its 
longevity: 
 
A great people, a mixture of people gathered in from all Europe, have that as their 
Constitution and for 150 years they have retained it. The Taoiseach never compared 
that with what he has put into this Bill here. We have a series of Articles in our 
Constitution which state fundamental principles and rights. It has stated them with so 
many reservations that the rights and liberties have almost disappeared. The law may 
change, and if it does change the fundamental rights under the Constitution are gone.81 
 
McGilligan despaired of the impact of the OAS on speech:  
 
I take it for granted that there is acceptance in this House of certain fundamental rights 
that the people ought to have guaranteed to them, liberty under certain heads. Matters 
affecting conscience are not dealt with at all. There are [] others. ... that there should be 
freedom of the Press, and freedom to speak one’s thoughts.82  
 
The OAS would violate these rights.83  
Foremost in the minds of those opposed to the measures was the concern that the powers 
would be abused.84 The same objections had been brought forward during passage of the 
notorious 1931 Public Safety Act, with guarantees being given that such would not be the case. 
Nevertheless, the authorities had been abused: ‘[W]e found that the people who introduced 
that measure and sponsored it and succeeded in getting it passed were the very people who 
were penalised afterwards by the Act.’85 Backbenchers observed that while Fianna Fáil might 
be in power now, in the future, they could become subject to a different government wielding 
the proposed measures against them. The provisions, moreover, could be used against ordinary 
working people. Members hearkened back to the 1819 Peterloo massacre in Manchester, in 
which 18 ordinary working people had been killed and more than 650 injured when the cavalry 
was ordered to break up 60,000 protesters who had gathered seeking political reform. In the 
 
believe, myself, that this false and panicky legislation is being brought in because a few bombs were let off in 
England. ... we should let England alone to look after her own affairs just in the same way as we have called upon 
her to let us alone to look after our affairs.’); ibid col 1358 ( ‘We are told … that this Bill must be brought in, that 
there is immediate danger. I travel all over the country … and I have met no Deputy yet who said there is danger, 
or even a semblance of danger’.). 
78 See, eg, Seán Brodrick, Dáil Deb 2 March 1939, vol 74, col 1375 (adding, ‘I am not convinced of the necessity 
for this Bill at present’.). 
79 See, eg, Mr Hogan’s concern ‘that it gives to too great power to the Government to suppress organisations 
[and] to control the Press’. Patrick Hogan, Seanad Deb 3 May 1939, vol 22, cols 1536-37. 
80 General Seán MacEoin, Dáil Deb 7 March 1939, vol 74, col 1566 (‘[T]here is enshrined in the Constitution the 
liberty of the citizen, a very find doctrine; the sacredness of the home, a very fine doctrine; the liberty of the 
Press, a very fine doctrine. All are guaranteed. Freedom of meeting is guaranteed. But, having done all that, we 
bring in a measure, to be made an ordinary Statute of the Oireachtas, reducing all those things that are guaranteed 
under the Constitution’.) 
81 Patrick McGilligan, Dáil Deb 2 March 1939, vol 74, cols 1399-1400. 
82 ibid col 1400. 
83 See ibid. 
84 See, eg, Patrick Cogan, Dáil Deb 2 March 1939, vol 74, col, 1300 (‘[W]e are placing extraordinary powers in 
the hands of the Government to suppress organisations and to interfere with the liberty of the Press and the 
citizens generally. It is our duty to make sure that these powers will not be abused’.) 
85 ibid. 
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Seanad, Cumann na nGaedheal politician John McLoughlin made dire predictions, quoting 
Shelley: ‘I met Murder on the way,/He wore the mask of Castlereagh,/ Very smooth he looked, 
yet grim,/ Seven bloodhounds followed him.’86 
Despite such misgivings, the OAS passed. It might have been that international concerns 
loomed large; but the language continued to be redolent of the anti-Treaty challenges to the 
state. The restrictions on freedom of expression, in particular, targeted Republican activities. 
 
2. Impact of the 1939 OAS on Speech, Expression, and the Associative Rights 
 
The 1939 OAS had immediate implications for freedom of expression. The statute made 
it illegal to advocate the usurpation or unlawful exercise of government functions (s 6); to 
obstruct government functions, legislative, executive, or judicial (s 7); to incite or encourage 
any State employee to refuse, neglect or omit to perform his duty, or to be negligent or 
insubordinate in its performance; or to advocate or encourage the doing of any such thing (s 
9). Each of these measures represented a response to past challenges mounted by Republicans. 
It went on to create new strictures to deal with printed matter. 
 
a. Prohibitions on Publication and Possession Thereof 
 
The statute prohibited printing, publishing, selling, or distributing incriminating 
documents—which meant everything from books, newspapers, magazines, and publications, 
to pamphlets, circulars, or advertisements.87 Like Section 2A, the content of the speech or 
material did not matter. Instead, it understood incriminating documents as anything issued by 
or ‘emanating from an unlawful organisation’, as well as any document ‘appearing to aid or 
abet any such organisation’.88 The statute similarly forbade treasonable, as well as seditious 
documents, the latter being understood in particularly broad terms—ie, 
 
(a) a document consisting of or containing matter calculated or tending to 
undermine the public order or the authority of the State, and 
(b) a document which alleges, implies, or suggests or is calculated to suggest that 
the government functioning under the Constitution is not the lawful 
government of the State or that there is in existence in the State any body or 
organisation not functioning under the Constitution which is entitled to be 
recognised as being the government of the country, and 
(c) a document which alleges, implies, or suggests or is calculated to suggest that 
the military forces maintained under the Constitution are not the lawful 
military forces of the State, or that there is in existence in the State a body or 
organisation not established and maintained by virtue of the Constitution 
which is entitled to be recognised as a military force, and  
(d) a document in which words, abbreviations, or symbols referable to a military body 
are used in referring to an unlawful organisation.89 
 
In other words, the OAS forbade any effort to undermine the legitimacy of the Irish 
government as a political entity. Despite the backdrop of the war, it did not draw attention to 
what form that government ought to take (eg, an autocracy, an oligarchy, a democracy, or a 
republic). It similarly forbade documents related to paramilitary organisations as an alternative 
 
86 John McLoughlin, Seanad Deb 3 May 1939, vol 22, col 1531. See also Dáil Deb 2 March 1939, vol 74 
(kicking the difficult questions related to free speech to later discussions). 




to the existing military—again, a provision directly linked to the Republican challenge of 
being the appropriate heir to the fight for an independent Ireland. 
The statute went on to make it illegal to send or to publish any incriminating, treasonous, 
or seditious document.90 The penalties ranged from a fine and imprisonment to forfeiture of 
printing machinery.91 The law exempted official government documents from the reach of the 
law.92 During passage of the law, parliamentarians expressed alarm at the potential use of the 
measure to stifle political dissent.93 As a matter of reporting, even if the ‘truth’ could still be 
published, the risk was that political objections to government action might not escape. The 
government swept aside these objections. 
With the international political tension in mind, some politicians raised concern about the 
threat potentially posed by foreign control or manipulation of Ireland.94 The risk was that 
foreign interference might prevent peaceful negotiations of contentious matters.95 For them, 
the backdrop was not just Republicanism, but social and economic freedom, and the battle 
against ‘chaos and anarchy’.96 
Nevertheless, consideration of any changes remained closely tied to Republicanism. The 
Government responded, first, by suggesting that the penetration of Ireland by foreign 
publications was already covered by the existing distribution provisions.97 This explanation 
did not satisfy the Irish press, which conveyed its concern about the section creating unfair 
competition. Should Irish newspapers be prohibited, ‘foreign newspapers coming from 
England or the Six Counties or anywhere else could have black headlines in regard to those 
matters, and might, thereby, be in a position to carry on unfair competition against the Irish 
newspapers here’.98 
The Seanad, accordingly, brought in an additional provision targeting foreign 
newspapers.99 The measure provided for the Minister of Justice to order any foreign 
publications to denied entry, as well as seized and destroyed within domestic bounds.100 The 
decision of when (and whether) to ever lift the order lay entirely in the Minister’s hands.101 
Introducing the measure in Dáil Éirean, the Minister for Justice, Patrick Joseph Ruttledge, 
explained, ‘This amendment is necessitated by the fact that in the case of certain newspapers 
circulating in this country the printers and publishers are outside the jurisdiction of the State’.  
He added an additional concern:  to avoid putting distributors in the position of censoring 
material.102 
The 1939 OAS further outlawed mere possession of incriminating, treasonable, or 
seditious documents.103 The burden was on the defendant to demonstrate either that he did not 
know that he was in possession of the document, or that he did not know the nature of the 
contents of the document.104 Where publishers found themselves in possession of such 
material and the Gárda Síochána requested it, they had the option of either turning it over to 
 
90 ibid s 10(2)-(3). 
91 ibid s 10(3). 
92 ibid s 10(5). 
93 See, eg, William Davin and Richard Corish, Dáil Deb 7 March 1939, vol 74, cols 1562-63.  
94 See, eg, Frank Aiken, Minister for Defence, Dáil Deb 3 March 1939, vol 74, cols 1436-37. 
95 ibid col 1437. 
96 ibid col 1439. 
97 See, eg, Desmond Fitzgerald, Seanad Deb 31 May 1939, vol 22, col 1624 (asking if the Minister of Justice 
‘will have a means of dealing with the circulation and dissemination of papers printed outside this country whose 
purpose is, and contents are, hostile to the wellbeing of this country?’). 
98 William Quirke, Seanad Deb 17 May 1939, vol 22, col 1594. 
99 The measure was adopted as Amendment 2 in the Seanad. See OAS 1939, s 11. 
100 ibid s 11(1). 
101 ibid s 11(2). 
102 Patrick Joseph Ruttledge, Dáil Deb 6 June 1939, vol 76, col 581. 
103 OAS 1939, s 12(1). 
104 ibid s 12(3). 
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the police or destroying the document.105 The clause (Amendment 3 in the Senead), had been 
put forward at the request of Dublin newspapers to ensure the continued protection of their 
sources.106 To ensure that the relevant information be available, during the Committee stage, 
the government added a provision to require printers to retain copies of the documents, as well 
as particulars of the person for whom the work was done, for six months following 
publication.107 Such information had to be produced for the Gárda Síochána.108 In turn, with a 
few exceptions, publishers became required to put their name and address on every 
document.109 
 
3.  Evolution of OAS 
 
The 1939 OAS underwent four amendments, three of which are relevant to speech and 
expression.110 Like the initial provisions, the language of the amendments was tied to the 
historical Republican challenge. 
The first change, the 1940 Offences Against the State (Amendment) Act expanded the 
government’s power to determine what statements could be deemed to undermine public 
order.111 It contained a provision that empowered a Minister of State to order the arrest and 
detention of anyone ‘engaged in activities which, in his opinion, are prejudicial to the 
preservation of public peace and order or the security of the State’.112 Reminiscent of the 1922 
Special Powers Act provision granting the Northern Ireland Prime Minister the power ‘to take 
all such steps and issue all such orders as may be necessary for preserving the peace and 
maintaining order’, designation in the Republic could be based entirely on speech, expression, 
or associations considered by the Minister to be a threat.113  
History has not treated this provision kindly. In 1998, the Committee to Review the 
Offences Against the State Act raised significant concern about the measure: 
 
[I]t is difficult to avoid the conclusion that taken at its most extreme, [the 1940 Act] 
enables every Minister of State to take out of public circulation any individual whom 
he or she considers to pose a significant threat to public order. Against this background, 
one must therefore regard the 1940 Act as constituting a draconian interference with 
fundamental rights to liberty, due process, freedom of expression and freedom of 
association. The majority considers that the powers in question are inconsistent with 
 
105 ibid s 12(5). 
106 Patrick Joseph Ruttledge, Dáil Deb 6 June 1939, vol 76, cols 581-82 (‘It is intended to cover the case of a 
newspaper which innocently receives a treasonable document. The newspapers feel that they would have to 
observe a certain amount of secrecy, and they do not want to give away their correspondent. If they destroy the 
seditious document in the presence of a Guard that is a good defence in any prosecution that might be brought 
against them.’) 
107 OAS 1939, s 13(1)(b). See also Patrick Joseph Ruttledge, Seanad Deb 31 May 1939, vol 22, col 1624-25 
(inserting s 13(1)(a)-(c)). 
108 OAS 1939, s 13(1)(c). 
109 OAS 1939, s 14(1). For the most part, the exceptions related to formal government documents. See ibid s 
14(3)(c). For a good discussion of how these provisions were used to control news of the war, expression of 
opinions, see Donal Ó Drisceoil, Censorship in Ireland 1939-45: Neutrality Politics and Society (Cork, Cork 
University Press 1996). 
110 Offences Against the State (Amendment) Act 1940 (OASA 1940), Offences Against the State (Amendment) 
Act 1972 (OASA 1972), [Offences Against the State (Amendment) Act 1985 (nothing on 
speech/press/publication; focused on banks)], and Offences Against the State (Amendment) Act 1998 (OASA 
1998). 
111 See OASA 1940. 
112 ibid s 4. 
113 Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act (Northern Ireland) 1922, s 1(1). 
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the basic tenets of democracy and the rule of law, and it is inappropriate that a liberal 
democracy should retain them on its statute book in the twenty-first century.114 
 
The next relevant alteration to the OAS came in 1972, when the Oireachtas added a clause 
that allowed for membership in an unlawful organisation to be predicated upon any oral or 
written statement.115 The law also outlawed any oral or written statement, or meeting, that 
interfered with the ‘course of justice’, understood by statute to mean, anything intended, or 
likely (directly or indirectly) ‘to influence any court, person or authority’ concerned in 
criminal proceedings—including as a party or witness—the conduct or outcome of such 
proceedings.116 The statute amended the definition of ‘document’ in section 2 of the 1939 OAS 
to take account of different media. It expanded the measure to incorporate any map, plan, 
graph, or drawing; photograph; digital media; and film, microfilm, or tape.117 
Following the Omagh bombing of 15 August 1998, the Oireachtas further amended the 
OAS.118 Like its predecessors, the legislation viewed speech through an unlawful organisation 
lens. The law waived the right to silence for individuals accused of being a member of a 
proscribed entity.119 Not only could an inference of guilt be drawn from silence when accused 
of membership, but failure to provide a full account of one’s ‘movements, actions, activities, 
or associations during any specified period’, could be treated as corroboration of evidence 
related to the offence of being a member of such groups.120 The new law amended the prior 
definition of conduct to include failure to deny published reports of membership.121 The 
amendments also impacted freedom of expression by making it unlawful to collect, record or 
possess information that would be useful for unlawful organisations to engage in a serious 
offence.122 The burden lay on the defendant to demonstrate that they were not collecting the 
information for the purpose of it being used in the commission of a serious offence.123 
 
C. Emergency Powers Act 
 
An additional legislative instrument targeted violent political challenge and, relatedly, 
freedom of expression. On 2 September 1939 the Irish government declared a state of 
emergency in response to the outbreak of the war. The following day, the Oireachtas 
introduced the Emergency Powers Act, giving the government the power to make by order, 
‘such provisions as are, in the opinion of the Government, necessary or expedient for securing 
the public safety or the preservation of the State, or for the maintenance of public order, or for 
the provision and control of supplies and services essential to the life of the community’.124 
In regard to restrictions on speech, the law empowered the Minister to ‘authorise and 
provide for the censorship, restriction, control, or partial or complete suspension of 
communication by means of all or one or more of the services maintained or controlled by the 
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Minister for Posts and Telegraphs or by any other means, whether public or private, specified 
or indicated in such emergency order’.125 Such orders could contain ‘all such incidental or 
ancillary provisions as shall appear to the Government to be necessary or expedient for giving 
full effect to any provision inserted in such emergency order’.126 The underlying rationale was 
that the government could use the state organs of communications to head off challenges to 
the state. The order could be revoked at any time by the Government.127 The statute also 
empowered the government to make provision for ‘preserving and safeguarding the secrecy 
of official documents and information’, ‘controlling the publication of official information’, 
prohibiting the spread of ‘subversive statements and propaganda’, and controlling and 
censoring ‘newspapers and periodicals’.128 
The Irish Constitution, as aforementioned, provided a qualified guarantee of free 
expression (ie, excepting efforts to undermine public order or morality, or matter considered 
blasphemous, seditious, or indecent) in ‘normal’ times, but not ‘in time of war or armed 
rebellion’.129 Coincident with passage of the 1939 Emergency Powers Act, the Dáil amended 
the definition of the latter to include ‘a time when there is taking place an armed conflict in 
which the State is not a participant but in respect of which each of the Houses of the Oireachtas 
shall have resolved that, arising out of such armed conflict, a national emergency exists 
affecting the vital interests of the State’130 
The wartime (emergency) censorship regime operated 1939-45.131 During that time, the 
government implemented numerous articles targeting postal and telegraph censorship.132 
Other orders focused on press censorship.133 Of equal importance in preventing publication of 
certain matters, the censor undertook to promote certain themes. In September 1939, for 
instance, the Legal Advisor commented on the proposed Emergency Powers (No. 5) Order 
that Irish newspapers ‘be generally informed’ about the Government’s neutrality policy, such 
as it being “the only logical policy for Ireland which neither lost nor gained by the Peace 
Treaties, 1919’; ‘the only decent attitude for a Christian country like this to adopt at the present 
time’, and carrying a much lesser cost than ‘the cost of war’. 134 The government sought further 
to shape public opinion by having ‘Irish newspaper editors…convey to the public…the fact 
that this is not a “world war” like that of 1914-1918’,  with a list of countries declaring their 
neutrality prominently published daily.135 The advisor sought to have the press point out the 
‘incidental “horrors of war”’ and to eliminate ‘the “atrocity” stories’.136  
The Emergency Powers Act also provided for amendment of the Censorship of Films Acts 
1923 and 1930, to give the censor the authority to reject a film on the grounds that it would 
be ‘prejudicial to the maintenance of law and order or to the preservation of the State or would 
be likely to lead to a breach of the peace or to cause offence to the people of a friendly foreign 
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nation’.137 The government issued a new order to allow the government to revoke prior 
approvals of films, where circumstances had changed and their availability was no longer 
desirable.138 Like the government’s efforts to shape the stories carried by newspapers, the 
emergency film provisions allowed for newsreels to be tightly controlled.139 For the most part, 
the censor focused on matters directly linked to World War II.140 
It was not until 1942 that the government assumed the emergency power to censor the 
printing or publication of books, pamphlets, or leaflets.141 Prior to that time, it had focused 
more narrowly on newspapers—leading to a tense relationship between journalists and the 
government.142 
In April 1946, the Minister for Finance, Frank Aiken, informed the Dáil that the 
Government had made 7,846 Emergency Powers Orders (and amendments thereto), of which 
522 had been primary orders.143 The censorship provisions in particular were used extensively 
to protect Irish neutrality.144 In September 1946, the statute formally lapsed.145 
 
III. BROADCAST AND FILM RESTRICTIONS 
 
While there is significant coverage in the secondary literature of ways in which the right to 
silence has been impacted by the OAS, there is rather less discussion how OAS provisions 
specifically targeting expression and association have affected individual rights.146 One reason 
for this may be because there is an alternative, and in many ways more visible, framework: 
statutes that openly regulate broadcasts, films, and publications.147 From the founding of the 
Irish Free State until the end of the 20th century, the government made extensive use of these 
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provisions. The provisions most salient for responding to paramilitary challenge were those 
related to broadcasting, although some of the film restrictions also captured political challenge. 
The censorship of publications, however, largely centered on preventing indecent or obscene 
material, or matters related to obtaining an abortion, from entering the public domain. 
 
A. Broadcast Bans 
 
Various laws regulate broadcasting in Ireland.148 The structure itself provides a level of 
control of political speech that stops short of outright censorship. Civil servants failing to 
adhere to the government line can simply be fired. The government has used this power to 
control messaging related to Republican challenge. In the 1970s, for example, a Radió Telefis 
Éireann (RTÉ) Authority defending a program that criticised the government’s handling of 
Northern Ireland was dismissed, as was a journalist who refused to provide the identity of an 
interviewee.149  
The law also provides for prohibition of material sympathetic to paramilitary aims. Section 
31 of the Broadcasting Act allows the Minister to direct the broadcast authority ‘to refrain 
from broadcasting any particular matter or matter of any particular class’ that ‘would be likely 
to promote, or incite to, crime or would tend to undermine the authority of the State’.150 This 
authority has been used to target violent, mainly Republican organisations, as well as political 
parties linked to the armed struggle. 
In 1971, Gerry Collins, the Fianna Fáil Minister for Posts and Telegraphs, issued a Section 
31 order directing RTÉ not to broadcast, ‘any matter that could be calculated to promote the 
aims or activities of any organisation which engages in, promotes, encourages or advocates 
the attaining of any particular objectives by violent means’.151  
Five years later, Labour Minister for Posts and Telegraphs, Conor Cruise O’Brien, 
strengthened the underlying statute and issued an order to prevent Sinn Féin and the 
Provisional IRA from being able to communicate through television and radio. The statutory 
amendment prohibited RTÉ from transmitting ‘anything which may reasonably be regarded 
as being likely to promote, or incite to, crime or as tending to undermine the authority of the 
State’.152 The new order forbade RTÉ from carrying any interview, or report of an interview, 
with a spokesperson for the IRA/Oglaigh na hÉireann; Provisional Sinn Féin; and any 
Northern Ireland organisation proscribed by the British government under the Northern 
Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1973.153 The government extended these orders in 12 
month increments, periodically expanding the list of organisations associated with violence in 
Northern Ireland.154 While predominantly Republican, Loyalist organisations also came within 
the prohibition. In 1983, for instance, the order included a ban not just on the IRA and Sinn 
Féin, but also the Irish National Liberation Army and the Ulster Defence Association.155 
Radió Teilfis Éireann took a rather conservative view of the broadcast ban and erred on 
the side of censorship, leading to a number of legal challenges. In 1982, the Supreme Court 
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upheld the broadcasting authority act and its progeny.156 But in 1993, the Supreme Court 
unanimously upheld a High Court decision ruling that an individual cannot be silenced solely 
based on membership of Sinn Féin.157 Justice O’Flaherty explained that an individual speaking 
on an anonymous topic on the airwaves, even if a member of a proscribed group, was not 
outside the constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression.158 That same year, though, the 
court ducked when RTÉ refused to accept a radio advertisement by Gerry Adams, President 
of Sinn Féin, based on the Section 31 order.159 For the court, while an ordinary member of 
Sinn Féin might be protected under the Constitution, Adams was too closely associated with 
the core aims of the organization—leaving the ultimate decision on the matter up to RTÉ.160 
In 1988 the British government followed a parallel approach, preventing the voices of 
members of any of the proscribed organisations from being carried on the airwaves.161 The 
Government forbade the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and the Independent 
Broadcasting Authority from transmitting ‘any words spoken, whether in the course of an 
interview or discussion or otherwise.’162 The Home Office followed the orders with a letter to 
the BBC clarifying that the prohibition only applied to direct statements from members of the 
proscribed groups.163 Douglas Hurd defended the measures in Parliament: ‘Those who live by 
the bomb and the gun and those who support them cannot in all circumstances be accorded 
the same rights as the rest of the population’.164  
The media in Northern Ireland notoriously got around the British ban by using an actor’s 
voice in the place of Republican speakers. A similar situation never arose in the south, as the 
Irish prohibition did not allow word-for-word broadcasts.  
In 1991, an effort by several journalists and producers, and two trade unions subject to 
broadcast bans, argued in the European Commission of Human Rights that the prohibition 
violated their rights under Article 10 of the Convention.165 They asserted professional harm 
and the failure of Section 31 to meet the requisite ‘prescribed by law’ language in Article 10 
s 2.166 The Commission agreed that the order issued under Section 31 interfered with the 
applicants’ right to receive and impart ideas or information, but it rejected the claim that the 
law fell outside the prescribed limits.167 As to whether such restrictions were ‘necessary in a 
democratic society,’ the Commission noted the difficulty of striking the right balance: 
 
In a situation where politically motivated violence poses a constant threat to the lives 
and security of the population and where advocates of this violence seek access to the 
mass media for publicity purposes, it is particularly difficult to strike a fair balance 
between the requirements of protecting freedom of information and the imperatives of 
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protecting the State and the public against armed conspiracies seeking to overthrow the 
democratic order which guarantees this freedom and other human rights.168 
 
On the whole, the Irish provisions were compatible with Article 10 s 2.169 The purpose of the 
provision was not to stop the media, but to restrict the ability of those involved in terrorism 
from pursuing their cause.170 The Commission recognized that, relative to print media, 
broadcast media had considerably more power: “Their impact,” the Commission wrote, “is 
more intimate than that of the print media, and the possibilities for the broadcaster to correct, 
qualify, interpret or comment on any statement made on radio or television are limited in 
comparison with those available to journalists in the press.”171 Live broadcast, moreover, ran 
the risk of being used to carry out real-time operations—something that print reporters could 
avoid by screening the material conveyed.172 
In 1994, Michael D Higgins, the Irish Minister for Arts, Culture and the Gaeltacht did not 
seek renewal of the broadcast ban under Section 31.173 In 2001 the Oireachtas repealed the 
underlying provisions.174   
 
B. Censorship of Films 
 
Irish law also provides broadly for the censorship of film, advertisements, video, and DVD 
recordings.175 The first such law, the Censorship of Films Act of 1923, created the office of 
the Official Censor of Films, as well as an appeals board.176 Two years later, the Oireachtas 
added advertisements to the material that could be prohibited or restricted.177 In 1930 the law 
expanded to include vocal and other sounds.178 For forty years, the law stood unchanged until 
amended to allow films to be re-submitted seven years after their publication had been 
denied.179 Some forms of modern media became part of the censorship framework in 1989, 
with the addition of video and DVD recordings.180 
From the 1920s until the 1980s, the government made extensive use of these provisions. 
According to the Irish Film Censors’ Records, the board banned more than 2,500 films and 
cut over 11,000 more.181 Even prominent stars and films, and work by well-known directors, 
such as Humphrey Bogart and Lauren Bacall in The Big Sleep (1946); Stanley Kubrick’s 
Clockwork Orange (1971); Monty Python’s Life of Brian (1979); Monty Python’s The 
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Meaning of Life (1983); and Oliver Stone’s Natural Born Killers (1994) failed to pass the 
morality test.182 
Although the board rejected most films on religious and moral grounds, some fell under 
the knife because of the level of violence or the manner in which they portrayed crime. In 
1932, for instance, the Censorship Board rejected Scarface, a film loosely based on Al 
Capone’s syndicate. Despite considering the film ‘anti-gangster propaganda’, that portrayed 
the law as ‘triumphant’, censors determined that, ultimately it pandered to sensationalism: ‘If 
this propaganda is justifiable where will it stop? Similar realism might offered for say – the 
white slave traffic – or other social evils’.183 When the producers submitted the film for 
reconsideration two decades later, the censors did not waiver. They explained, ‘This picture 
of the underworld is gangsterdom at its worst. Its features are violence, brutality, murders and 
loose women. Certificate refused’.184 
The board rejected other films because of the political ideology they espoused. For 
instance, One Day in Soviet Russia, a 1941 Russian documentary portraying snapshots of life 
in the Soviet Union on 24 August 1940, fell outside acceptable bounds.185 Other films 
effectively banned by the government, like the 1968 film Rocky Road to Dublin, directly 
challenged the legitimacy of the state. 
In 2008, the Irish Film Censor’s Office was re-cast as the Irish Film Classification Office 
(Oifig Aicmithe Scannán na hÉireann). The office now rates films according to their 
appropriateness for different age levels and only occasionally prohibits certain films on the 
grounds that they are indecent or obscene. 
 
C. Censorship of Publications 
 
Various laws provide for censorship of the written word.186 In 1929 the Oireachtas 
established a Censorship of Publications Board to consider complaints referred to them 
regarding indecent or obscene materials, or anything advocating ‘the unnatural prevention of 
conception or the procurement of abortion or miscarriage’.187 Like films, periodicals also could 
be prohibited where they provided an undue amount of attention to crime.188 In 1946 the 
Oireachtas amended the statute to provide for a Publications Appeal Board.189 Just over twenty 
years later, the Oireachtas set a 12 year limit to banned works.190 At the same time, the 
Censorship of Publications Board retained the authority to make a further prohibition order in 
relation to the publication.191 
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Like the films that fell outside the approved standards, most of the censored works raised 
concern about obscenity and immoral behavior.192 Some provided information about 
abortion.193 Others depicted gruesome attacks.194 A minority of the banned publications, such 
as News of the World (prohibited in 1930) had a political bent.195  
Overall, the number of new prohibition orders steadily declined from the 1990s onward. 
Nevertheless, as of 2012, 274 books and periodicals were still banned.196 In 2003, 9 periodicals 
were banned.197 In 2016, for the first time in 18 years, the board banned a book on grounds of 
obscenity.198 
 
IV. NEW MEDIA, NEW THREATS 
 
The world has changed, and the Irish state now faces threats considerably different than those 
it contemplated in 1939. One of the most critical issues right now—for Ireland and its allies—
is countering significant threats posed by social media, societal manipulation, and interference 
in Western democratic institutions.199 There are myriad aspects of new media that deserve 
attention—an enterprise that goes beyond this chapter. Before concluding, however, it is 
important to note some of the most difficult areas that do not fit easily into the OAS: the 
development of extremist ideologies, terrorist recruitment, and the promotion of acts of 
terrorism. Lurking in the shadows are concerns about how efforts to address these challenges 
may impact not just freedom of expression, but Ireland’s international commitments. 
 
A. Extremist Ideology and Terrorist Recruitment 
 
As noted at this beginning of this chapter, one of the most serious societal consequences 
of increasing dependence on social media is the way in which it alienates individuals and 
increases levels of depression and anxiety. The structure—algorithms that preference similar 
views and trending material, the swift proliferation of emotionally-imbued information, and 
the ‘like’ function—privileges extreme emotions. Of these, fear and anger fly most swiftly 
through the networks. Sophisticated algorithms pre-select what material users see, with the 
result that individuals become not just more entrenched in their world views, but more 
extreme. Ideas that previously one might not have even voiced suddenly are brought within 
the realm of possibility. The fact that other people are articulating the ideas, particularly when 
an algorithm feeds multiple such articulations in to an individual’s feed, creates a skewed 
world view: ie, that such ideas are mainstream, when in fact, they are not. The situation 
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becomes even more pronounced when botnets amplify specific messages, making is seem like 
they are ‘trending’ news, when they are not. 
The situation is ripe for organisations committed to violence to create greater sympathy 
for their cause and to recruit potential members. Because of the global nature of new media, 
they can do it from half a world away—anonymously. This is a very different situation than 
that which the Irish state has historically confronted. 
Consider the role of social media as a recruitment platform. It runs 24 hours a day, seven 
days a week, and it is individualised. As one commentator has observed, it ‘allows terrorists 
to reach out to their target audiences and virtually ‘knock on their doors’—in contrast to older 
models of websites in which terrorists had to wait for visitors to come to them’.200 The targets, 
moreover, can be hand-chosen, based on factors identifying individuals potentially 
sympathetic to the cause. This is essentially how new media advertising works: pre-selecting 
certain criteria, such as certain types of past news articles that users have ‘liked’, the list of 
followers or friends, or membership in certain social media clusters (eg, groups, chats, or 
hashtags), and then using that information to approach the individuals; to manipulate users 
with a significant power base in the network to take certain steps which, in turn is emulated 
by others in the group; or to design individually-targeted advertisements. The prioritization of 
information based on user preferences makes it easier to identify potential members.  
Recent estimates suggest this is how ISIS has used new media to recruit more than 16,000 
foreign fighters.201 Global recruitment to a cause may motivate people to travel outside the 
country to fight. As a domestic matter, new media may help to radicalise individuals and 
motivate them to become engaged in violence.202 This is not the same thing as prohibiting 
violent depictions from circulating—one of the targets of decades of restrictions placed on 
films and publications. It is using messaging to generate increasingly extreme views. 
Because of the massive amounts of data now available on individuals, the process can be 
highly individualised and hard to detect. A group may seek out disenfranchised or disaffected 
people by tweeting, retweeting, or using popular hashtags related to divisive current events. 
By creating an online micro-community around the targeted recruit, the individual begins to 
develop a sense of comradery and belonging. The micro-community can then nudge the person 
to become increasingly isolated from others, before shifting the conversation to private social 
media platforms that have encryption, such as WhatsApp, Kik, or Telegram. 
What does the 1939 OAS and its progeny have to say about this kind of challenge? As 
discussed above, the statute makes it unlawful to distribute treasonable, seditious, or 
incriminating documents, or to contribute such materials to any newspaper or periodical.203 
But these provisions grow from Republicanism. Numerous kinds of violent challenges exist 
that have no bearing whatsoever on the overthrow of the Irish government. Material related to 
their operations falls outside the definition of treason.  
The definitions provided for the second type of material, seditious documents, also 
narrowly contemplate Republican paramilitary violence.204 The real question is whether new 
media postings related to extremist organisations could be understood as material emanating 
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from an unlawful organisation or ‘calculated to promote the formation’ of one.205 Unlike 
Section 31 of the Broadcast Act, under the OAS such associations do not have to be known 
by distinctive names in order to be unlawful.206 
For the target being recruited, it may be difficult to consider a comment on existing news 
stories as material ‘calculated to promote the formation’ of an unlawful organisation. Much of 
what is said online in open fora amounts to little more than a rant. Giving voice to frustration 
is not the same as calling for individuals to create an organisation.  
There are further problems with applying these provisions to the new media environment. 
First, is social media the equivalent of a newspaper? A strong argument could be mounted that 
it is a form of communication—not journalism. It is merely individuals stating their views. 
Posting is not the same as publishing. Individuals online may operate qua individuals. They 
may limit their communications to limited numbers of ‘friends’. They are not subject to 
government regulation as a particular industry. They are simply citizens offering their thoughts 
or views—or circulating ideas or information. 
Second, the type of material that may lead to online terrorist recruitment does not have to 
stem from or be directly related to unlawful organisations. They may simply be news articles 
reporting on actions taken by the government. Or perhaps they may highlight a growing social 
or economic concern. Nor do they have to emphasize obstructing government or interfering 
with the military—issues historically relevant to Republicanism, but not consistent with 
contemporary challenges.207 Nor is the effort to surround civilians with micro-communities 
the same thing as organising a meeting at which treasonous documents could be found. 
Instead, discussions may center on historical injustices, or future economic concerns linked to 
Brexit and the European Union. When the aim is recruitment, the matters being pursued do 
not have to be directly linked to any violence whatsoever. They do not have to contemplate 
the overthrow of the state or sedition. 
Third, material proliferates, quite literally, at the speed of light. So as soon as a comment 
is posted, it almost immediately may be picked up and re-posted by hundreds, or even 
thousands of people—making the prosecution of all of those involved in the circulation of 
such material preposterous.208 Nor can such material, in any way, be ‘given up’ to the Gárda 
Síochána.209 Even erasing it online will fail to eradicate it from online caches. These are not 
documents that can be ‘seized’ or ‘destroyed’.210 
Fourth, the law makes it unlawful to possess certain documents.211 But the way new media 
works, users do not have control over material on their accounts. For one, sophisticated 
algorithms pick material for their feed. For another, those purchasing ads get access to the user 
without the user’s permission. Where a user employs a particular hashtag, any number of 
comments may be generated on the same topics. There is not necessarily a causal relationship. 
Fifth, and finally, anonymity online may make it almost impossible to ascertain who is 
posting the materials. In fact, it could be bots creating and putting information online. Clearly, 
the government is not going to prosecute a computer program. All of this, moreover, can be 
done in absentia. That is, those pulling the strings will be nowhere near the country. A 
newspaper can be stopped at the border. Global communications systems cannot. 
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B. Heightened Impact of Terrorist Incidents 
 
In 1974, Brian Jenkins famously observed, ‘Terrorism is theater’.212 If an entity gets 
enough attention, it doesn’t matter how powerful it is. The goal is to ensure that what the 
organisation does is seen. By publicizing violence, entities can create fear in others and thus 
manipulate the political process. At some level, if an entity gets enough attention, it doesn’t 
matter how large or powerful it is. The ability to capture attention itself is power. 
New media has already become a platform for those engaged in violence to magnify the 
impact of their actions. In 2014, for instance, ISIS branded their offensive #AllEyesOnISIS to 
ensure that the world was watching. Far from hiding, the insurgency sought global attention.  
Unlike in the past, where violent organisations have been dependent on the news media 
(which could be regulated), with the new platforms, they can convey their own messages. They 
control the narrative in a way that they have not historically been able to. They can 
communicate with their target audience directly. And the more extreme the actions are, the 
more emotion they generate, ensuring that the news moves even more swiftly through online 
communications. So organisations can harness the power of others—including, most 
especially, ordinary citizens—to get their message across. 
4chan and its progeny is instructive. 4chan is an English language imageboard modeled 
on Japanese imageboards [(ie, Futaba channel (2 channel)]. Launched in 2003, it was initially 
focused on manga and anime. As it migrated to English, the site became known for its 
protections for speech. It quickly became linked to a number of Internet subcultures, like 
Anonymous, the alt-right, and Project Chanology. In 2013, users frustrated with what 
restrictions 4chan did have launched 8Chan.  
When Brenton Tarrant, a white supremacist, went on a rampage in Christchurch, New 
Zealand, killing 51 people at a mosque, he announced that he was going to do it via 8Chan.213 
He then broadcast the shooting on Facebook Live, YouTube, Twitter, and Instagram.214 During 
the attack, Tarrant shouted, ‘Remember, lads, subscribe to PewDiePie’—a reference to an anti-
Semitic YouTube channel with 89 million followers—the highest number on YouTube.215 The 
anti-immigrant manifesto itself picked up language from the troll community online, 
suggesting that the act itself was inspired from online associations.216  
Such incidents point to an underlying concern: the platform is built for speed, which means 
that posts fly around the globe. It would be very hard for Ireland to use the OAS or even its 
other broadcast and publication provisions to prevent the dissemination of similar photos, 
video, and content. Unlike the broadcast media, which is tightly controlled, the Irish 
government controls neither global social media platforms nor every user worldwide. The 
alternative legal structure, moreover, on which the government has depended to restrict the 
publicity afforded to terrorist organisations, Section 31 of the Broadcast Act, is premised on 
government control of what is broadcast and on the prior identification of paramilitary 
organisations. It is virtually impossible to do this globally. 
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Notably, organisations can use social media not just to promote their own actions and 
‘brand’, but to undermine the opponent’s narrative.217 This can become particularly insidious 
when paired with false information, much less deep fakes.  
 
VI. Concluding Remarks 
 
One potential response to the lack of coverage in the OAS for the types of threats emanating 
from new media that the state is and will be facing in the future is to simply try to amend the 
statute going forward. Significant concerns related to freedom of expression, democracy, and 
the ubiquity of new media, however, create a barrier. Beyond this, it is not at all clear that 
Ireland could take such actions and still meet its international legal obligations. 
International Law requires that Ireland observe right to freedom of expression and 
dissemination of opinion. Under Article 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights 
(ECHR), this right includes the freedom not just to hold opinions, but ‘to receive and impart 
information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers’.218  
The convention recognises that states can license broadcast, television, or cinema enterprises 
and, (assumedly) by extension, new media. It protects restrictions ‘necessary in a democratic 
society’, introduced ‘in the interests of national security’, or adopted to prevent ‘disorder or 
crime’.219 But how far such provisions can go into impacting the creation of online 
communities may well trigger claims under Article 11, which protects the right of peaceable 
assembly and association.220 
In 2010, the ECHR considered  a case in which Turkish magazine editors had been 
convicted for publishing statements made by members of illegal Marxist-Leninist 
organisations.221 The Court rejected the country’s effort to criminalize publication of 
statements by terrorist organisations, without any consideration for the broader context. They 
reasoned that should identity be sufficient to preclude speech, Article 10 would fail to afford 
sufficient protection. Since the statements in question did not threaten or perpetuate violence, 
the national security justification for restriction expression was insufficient to overcome the 
protections in Article 10. Lynch) v Cooney aside, the cases raises question as to whether, under 
the Convention, Ireland could prohibit individuals from using social media purely on the basis 
of their identity. 
Like the ECHR, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights protects the right of freedom 
of opinion and expression: ‘this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference 
and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of 
frontiers’.222 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) similarly 
guarantees: 
 
 Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom 
to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either 
orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.223 
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While some limits can be enacted for national security, public order, or moral considerations, 
the General Comment on the provision underscores the importance of freedom of opinion and 
expression to self-realisation and democratic governance:  
 
Freedom of opinion and freedom of expression are indispensable conditions for the full 
development of the person. They are essential for any society. They constitute the foundation 
stone for every free and democratic society. The two freedoms are closely related, with 
freedom of expression providing the vehicle for the exchange and development of 
opinions.224  
 
Human rights relies heavily on freedom of expression.225  
Under the ICCPR, freedom of opinion is further protected by other articles and central to 
the enjoyment of other rights, such as the right to vote.226 It is so central that even in an 
emergency, states party cannot derogate from it.227 Under the convention, all branches of the 
state are required to respect it.228 No discrimination is allowed: ‘All forms of opinion are 
protected, including opinions of a political, scientific, historic, moral or religious nature. It is 
incompatible with paragraph 1 to criminalize the holding of an opinion’.229 
Not only do these instruments appear to protect individuals who post online, but freedom 
of expression also includes the right to obtain information—including, specifically, online.230 
Means of expression include books, newspapers,231 pamphlets,232 posters, banners,233 dress and 
legal submissions. 234  And they include all forms of audio-visual as well as electronic and 
internet-based modes of expression.’235 As Frank La Rue explained: 
 
 Although Internet access is not yet recognized as a right in international human rights 
law, States have a positive obligation to create an enabling environment so that all 
individuals can exercise their right to freedom of opinion and expression. This includes 
putting in place a concrete and effective policy and the political will to ensure universal 
access to the Internet’.236 
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Under the ICCPR, the protection of media and freedom of expression online is particularly 
important—not least because freedom of the press is integral to other rights: ‘A free, 
uncensored and unhindered press or other media is essential in any society to ensure freedom 
of opinion and expression and the enjoyment of other Covenant rights. It constitutes one of 
the cornerstones of a democratic society’.237 Without a free press, and the ability freely ‘to 
comment on public issues without censorship or restraint,’ the right to vote has been 
compromised.238 ‘The public also has a corresponding right to receive media output’.239 This 
includes the right of the media to be able to produce and to receive information.240 The advent 
of social media, if anything, underscores the importance of protecting the right:  
 
There is now a global network for exchanging ideas and opinions that does not necessarily 
rely on the traditional mass media intermediaries.  States parties should take all necessary 
steps to foster the independence of these new media and to ensure access of individuals 
thereto.241  
 
To ensure this, the ICCPR requires that any statutes related to treason, sedition, or public order, 
must be drawn as narrowly as possible. 242 The problem with the challenge posed by new media 
is that the threats to the state may present in very different form—one for which a broad 
approach may be the only solution. In adopting it, however, the risk presents that the state will 
fail to fulfill its international obligation to protect free expression.  
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